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Abstract 
 The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between NATO 
and Russia, to explain the historical background of their relationship, to 
detect challenges of their relation and to specify the potential future areas of 
cooperation. Some of their policy objectives are overlapping, so the 
cooperation enables them to accomplish these important objectives. 
Although NATO became the most powerful military international 
organization in the world, over the years, it confronts strategic challenges and 
dilemmas divided in two groups: existing and new. These challenges 
included Russia’s aspiration for dominance, developments in Afghanistan, 
terrorism as an international risk, the Arab Spring, China as a global player 
and turn of the United States foreign policy toward the Asia-pacific region.  
This paper will focus on one of these challenges: Russia’s ambitions for 
dominance and its influence on NATO-Russia relationship, identifying 
specific areas and issues of cooperation and confrontation. In the foreseeable 
future, NATO needs to focus on challenges and developments of a strategic 
importance for the Alliance, such as the innovative efforts for enhanced 
relationships, limited missions, operations and a realistic combination of 
solutions that can serve the principles and values of all NATO allies, 
including the most influential.  
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“Great powers don’t join coalitions, they create coalitions. 
Russia considers itself a great power.” 
Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin, 
Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, March 2009 
 
Introduction 
 The origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (further in the 
text: NATO, the Alliance) are often connected with the need of its members 
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to balance the rising power of the Soviet Union after the Second World War. 
This is referred to as its main raison d’être. On the other hand, the 1980s 
symbolizes the end of Soviet imperial rule that did not lead to end of NATO. 
Consequently, NATO is the most successful and long-lasting military 
alliance in history, the key instrument for defense of its members against 
Soviet subversion or attack and a key mechanism in speeding up the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.     
 The persistence of NATO can be found in three main factors. First, 
the creation of a new Alliance strategic concept adopted at the end of 1991 
just days before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a reflection of the 
need for protection against an uncertain future. This model or concept noted 
one of the four fundamental security tasks of NATO - the necessity to 
“preserve the strategic balance in Europe” (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 1991: paragraph 21). 
 Second, as a military alliance, NATO was formed to recognize threats 
or to balance the countervailing power of the Soviet Union. However, NATO 
has always meant more than providing this sense of balance: according to the 
Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 its member states were 
determined “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of 
their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and 
the rule of law”. Over time, it developed from alliance for military protection 
of its member states into a viable institutional expression of the transatlantic 
community of states united by their determination to defend the western 
values that defined them.   
 Third, the need for change and adaptation of its structure and mission 
to its new environment reshaped the organization, both military and 
politically. In this process, the Alliance transformed into a politico-military 
entity. The military adjustment has led to a more flexible authority structure 
with ability for rapid deployment of armed forces. The political adaptation 
meant that the Alliance needed new missions in order to maintain its 
importance – from peacekeeping missions to non-proliferation of weapons of 
massive destruction (Brookings Institution 2001: 1-3). 
 In the begging of the 21st century there were three feasible concepts 
of NATO: an alliance of collective defense, an alliance of collective security 
and an alliance of collective interests. The first purpose defined NATO as a 
military alliance whose aim was to provide protection from Russia. The 
second purpose described the organization as an institution whose main aim 
was to promote the western values and to enhance stability and security 
throughout Europe, but also to keep the sense of a community that holds both 
sides of the Atlantic together. And finally, the last purpose was a vision of an 
organization that defends its member states against any kind of common 
security threats.  
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 Over the years, NATO showed great capability for quick adaptation 
to new circumstances and conditions in the changing global strategic 
landscape, but this ability led to insufficient unity among its member states, 
and consequently, an inadequate political determination to provide NATO 
with the necessary qualifications for an ambitious schedule. Thus, the 
Alliance needs a sense for flexibility and openness. 
 
Historical background and current status of the mutual relations 
between NATO and Russia 
 The official beginning of the relationship between NATO and Russia 
was the inaugural session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
founded in December 1991. In 1997 The Council was renamed in Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Council was created with an aim 
to encourage a new relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. In order to build up and individual relation with the Alliance, Russia 
joined the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) in 1994, which deepened 
their relationship. PfP was created to offer bilateral cooperation on many 
issues and to oversee the security cooperation and peacekeeping operations 
between both entities. It means practical participation in NATO’s 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (SFOR and KFOR).   In the 
1990s the Russia’s contribution in the peacekeeping operations (IFOR and 
SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was the biggest compared to other non-
NATO contributors. 
 In the 1990s, Russia had a few reasons to be reserved with regards to 
PfP and NATO’s enlargement. Russian position on NATO enlargement 
toward East was clear: the classical geopolitical view of Russia was 
connected with the necessity to have influence in the region and to create a 
strong bond with the countries in the region. The other reason is the fact that 
Russia has identical reputation as other post-Soviet countries. This was not in 
accordance with Russia’s interpretation of its own geopolitical position in the 
world. Furthermore, the level of significance of PfP for Russia was different 
than for countries from Central and East Europe, because the only practical 
use of this program for these countries was to reshape their military forces in 
accordance with NATO standards.  
 In March 1999, former Soviet satellite states Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic joined NATO. In order to balance these memberships, in 
1997 (the period when the accession talks for these three countries began) 
NATO and Russia agreed the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security”. This Act gave Russia the capability to be part of 
the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and to be at the same table as members of 
NATO (in the “19+1” format). The cooperation continued and in 1998 
Russia established a diplomatic mission to NATO. However, one year later 
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their relations were strained by the Alliance’s intervention in Yugoslavia, 
when Russia withdrew its representatives from NATO headquarters (Foxall 
2014: 4-5).  
 The cooperation between NATO and Russia has started more 
intensively in 2002, on the basis of NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The new 
format of cooperation replaced the previous “19+1” (“NATO+1”) format 
under the former Permanent Joint Council (PJC). One of the major benefits 
of the NATO-Russia Council of 20 was the opportunity for Russia to be part 
of the discussions within NATO from the beginning. Both sides were 
ambitious to cooperate within NRC as equal partners on a broad range of 
security matters in the Euro-Atlantic region and in accordance with the 
Foundation Act of NRC (consensus-building, cooperation, consultation, joint 
decision and united action for the member states of NATO and Russia). On 
the other hand, the Foundation Act of NRC noted that cooperation between 
NATO member states and Russia will increase in areas including anti-
terrorism, non-proliferation, crisis management, arms control-building 
measures, confidence-building measures, search and rescue at sea, theatre 
missile defense, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies. 
Although real activities have been restrained, there were areas where actual 
results were achieved, such as ISAF mission in Afghanistan (Padrtovẚ, 2012: 
24-26). 
 The terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 made it clear 
that security threats, such as terrorism, instability in Central Asia and 
weapons of mass destruction are common for both entities. One year later, 
with Rome Declaration the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established in 
which NATO and Russia members sit as equals (“27 members”, instead of 
“26+1”) and make a decisions by consensus. The meetings of the NRC were 
temporarily suspended in 2008 during the war between Russia and Georgia. 
Although there were certain areas in which NATO stopped cooperation with 
Russia, the cooperation continued on issues with common interest, such as 
fight against terrorism and counter-narcotics.   
 The first meeting of NATO-Russia Council in December 2009 was an 
attempt to revive their relationship by agreeing to launch a “Joint Review of 
21st century Common Security Challenges”. Their cooperation continued 
over the years: the NRC revised its 2004 “Action Plan on Terrorism” in 
2011; the next year, General Knud Bartels10 visited Russia to improve 
military-to-military cooperation; and in 2013, Anders Fogh Rasmussen met 
with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss possible 
methods to upgrade the dialogue on the issue of missile defense.  
                                                          
10 General Knud Bartels is a retired Danish general. He served as a Danish Chief of Defence 
between 2009 and 2011. He was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 2011 to 
2015. 
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 There are two different conceptions in their mutual relations: NATO 
is not willing to allow Russia to have a veto over NATO’s decisions, while 
Russia sees itself as a world power that deserves a full voice in security 
issues in Europe. However, it is more than just a question of power, it is an 
issue of purpose. The intention of NATO is to create stability and security in 
Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, Russia is responsible for creating conflicts and 
instability in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in order to expand its influence 
in the region and prevent further influence by NATO. Russia made an 
objection to NATO’s policy of expansion of its influence toward Central and 
Eastern Europe. On the other hand, NATO believed that its ambition to 
enlarge stability, prosperity and peace in Europe will be recognized and 
accepted by Russia as an advantage to all, instead as a threat to Russia 
(Goldgeier 2010: 10).  
 The current status of their relations can be derived from their security 
cultures and different perceptions on European security and what threatens it. 
Russian approach preserves a strictly geopolitical understanding of security, 
while NATO maintain on its wider interpretation of security.  
 Their policy formulations are characterized by their mutual 
perceptions. According to NATO, there is no need for Russia to consider 
NATO as a threat and NATO do not consider Russia as a threat to its 
member states and their population (Rasmussen 2012). However, there was 
negative rhetoric on the Russian side: Russia perceives NATO as a military 
bloc hostile to its interests.   
 Current relations between NATO and Russia are characterized by 
noticeable differences and complications. Their relationship is contradictory 
by nature, with areas and issues of close cooperation as a counterbalance of 
its ideological confrontation, distrust and reciprocal criticism.  
 The relationship between these two entities can be analyzed by 
dividing it into four phases, each with specific features and qualities. 
 The first phase covered the period from 1991 to 1998. It was 
characterized by creating a regulatory and legal basis for bilateral relations: 
the process of signing strategic documents that would formalize their 
cooperation. This was a period when the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint 
Council began operation. The leaders from both sides demonstrated the 
necessary political will necessary for creating a path of military and political 
cooperation. NATO and Russia accomplished mutual peacekeeping 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 The second phase covered a one year period - from 1999 to 2000. It 
was characterized by significant decline in mutual relations. The reason for 
this downturn was Russia’s reaction to the NATO operation in Kosovo, 
which -according to Russia- was performed without strict mandate of the UN 
Security Council and with infringement of international law. Their 
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cooperation in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo was not always successful 
(Alexeev 2014:15).  
 The third phase, from 2001 to 2004, was associated with Vladimir 
Putin coming to power, as a president. As paradoxical as it may seem, this 
phase brought a new wave of cooperation, related to common threats and 
challenges. Putin took several steps toward NATO and the West, giving 
support to the USA in the war on terrorism and joining the anti-terrorism 
coalition.  In 2001, in Moscow, NATO opened the NATO Military Liaison 
Mission and the NATO Information Center. The next year, the Russia-NATO 
Council was created which coordinated the bilateral cooperation and moved 
it to a higher level. This progress from the Permanent Joint Council of 
“19+1” to the Russia-NATO Council of “20” -  according to former NATO 
Secretary-General George Robertson - was not a question of arithmetic or 
mathematic, but of chemistry (Czulda, 2013: 180). This third phase was the 
most positive and successful period in the history of their relation. 
 The fourth phase, covered the period from 2005 to 2012. It was the 
longest and most complex period in terms of its structure. Their mutual 
relations came across many compromises and challenges during this phase, 
but still in the sense of “pragmatic cooperation and strategic competition”. 
The Russia-Georgia war in 2008 was a great challenge in their bilateral 
relations. The ISAF mission, too. This was a period with visible military 
cooperation and poor political tone. Some unfavorable events, such as the so-
called “color revolutions” in several former Soviet republics, were 
considered by Russia as a direct cause of interference of USA and Western 
Europe. The accession of Baltic states in NATO and open enlargement policy 
towards Ukraine and Georgia provoked irritation in Moscow. The anti-
ballistic program and its implementation also sparked criticism from Russia. 
These NATO, USA and EU programs in the post-Soviet space were 
recognized as interference in the most sensitive area of Russian foreign 
policy. Russia supposed that supporting the USA in the anti-terrorism war 
and promoting a policy of political closeness would maintain the status quo 
in this zone of crucial interest for Russia. But, the reality was completely 
different. Russia-Georgia war in 2008 can be considered as an explicit 
reaction to the pressure in previous years. These events did not indicate any 
kind of return to confrontation between NATO and Russia. The history of 
mutual relations between NATO and Russia shows that alongside 
confrontations there are a number of successful joint operations in military, 
political and civilian areas. This has helped strengthen trust between NATO 
and Russia (Alexeev 2014: 15-16). 
 The relationship between NATO and Russia is one of the most 
significant relations that affect the Euro-Atlantic security. Their relationship 
faces cooperation in number of issues, such as International Security 
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Assistance Force mission (ISAF), counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, 
nuclear weapons, and crisis management. Although the cooperation, they 
faces a lot of challenges, such as NATO enlargement and its “open door” 
policy, and missile defense in Europe, which can lead to potential 
disagreements and can have a negative influence on their mutual cooperation 
in practice.  
  
Issues and areas of cooperation and confrontation 
Issues of cooperation  
 NATO and Russia face common threats of radical Islamists in 
Afghanistan and share common interests in stabilization of the region. One of 
the examples of successful cooperation between NATO and Russia is ISAF. 
It has been a keystone in NATO-Russia cooperation. This mission started in 
March 2008 and was based on strategic interests of Russia to allow land 
transit through Russia of non-military freight from NATO, its member states 
and non-NATO ISAF contributors, in support of the ISAF and according to 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386. The problem occurred 
when this political decision in such extremely sensitive field of cooperation 
needed to be presented to the Russian public and domestic political 
representatives. The connection of this decision to UN Resolution was a 
perfect explanation for the public, because any kind of refusal to fulfill the 
Resolution would lead to a major decrease in Russia’s reputation as a reliable 
partner. Moreover, the Russian Government adopted a decree on 25th June 
2012 which extended ISAF transit options to engage combine transportation, 
by rail, road and air. The transit was implemented by Russian transport 
companies through the Vostochny airport in the city of Ulyanovsk. Russia 
gained economic profit from the transport of around 160 thousand containers 
and 50 thousand wheeled vehicles. It meant around 800 million USD. 
Moreover, the country profited from selling helicopters Mi-17, military 
equipment and ammunition to NATO (Felbab-Brown, 2012).  
 Russia was deriving benefits from ISAF mission in terms of stability 
and security. NATO’s efforts were welcomed by Russia, especially in the 
area of stabilizing the southern boundaries of Russia and NATO’s attempts to 
control the region. It means that without the presence of NATO in the Central 
Asia region, the armed forces of Russia would have been responsible for 
maintaining the security and stabilization. In addition, ISAF protects Russia 
from infiltration of extremists or spread-out of their powers to the Russia’s 
key region of influence. Therefore, ISAF was a great opportunity for Russia 
to fulfill its direct interests for maintaining stability and security in the region 
of Central Asia (Padrtovẚ, 2012: 27-28). 
 NATO is facing a number of old and new challenges that occupy the 
interests of its member states. Russia’s aspiration for dominance is one of the 
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constant challenges for NATO. The Alliance has to find ways to balance 
between its main objectives - cooperative security and collective defense - 
and creating a partnership with Russia. 
 Russia is a difficult partner – its interest to keep a harsh attitude from 
time to time and to prevent the conflict resolution in Eastern Europe can 
constantly deteriorate or worsen the relation between two sides (Monaghan 
2011).  
 In 2013, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov confirmed the 
readiness of Russia to find models of interaction with NATO. He focused on 
two main factors for security in the Euro-Atlantic region: the ability of 
Russia and NATO to neutralize the risks from beyond the region and the 
level of readiness on both sides to jointly solve the problems that they 
inherited from the past. The relations of Russia with NATO should be based 
on trust, equality and consideration of each other’s interests. Lavrov 
emphasized that NATO should not take the path of appropriation of functions 
assigned to the UN Security Council or to attempt to justify force projection 
in any region of the world at the discretion of NATO. Lavrov concluded that 
the nature of their mutual cooperation will depend on the evolution of 
NATO, degree of readiness of its members to ensure supremacy of 
international law, consideration of other’s interests, respect the principle of 
equal and indivisible of security (Lavrov 2013).  
 Afghanistan will also remain a challenge. The predictions say that 
NATO will play an important role in this country until 2024 during the 
political transformation phase. Military engagement requires civilian 
responsibility. A set of reasonable decisions and a legitimate operation have 
transformed NATO into a guardian of a complex state-building process. 
NATO’s member states have had different reactions, some of them did not 
want to be a part of NATO’s missions and operations, and other focused on 
special operations and unmanned warfare (Riecke 2012: 3-5).   
 
Issues of confrontation and disagreement  
 Apart from the practical cooperation in Afghanistan, there are number 
of contentious issues on which the positions of NATO and Russia differ. 
These areas are connected with issues that concern strategic interests of both 
sides. Among them are the issues of the war in Georgia and the recognition 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The second issue is NATO’s enlargement 
policy, mainly, the possibility for membership of Ukraine and Georgia. The 
third issue covers the collaboration on missile defense in Europe. Despite 
these three major areas of disagreement, there are problematic issues in other 
areas - one of them is the Syria crisis, where the geopolitical interests of both 
sides slightly differed due to their strategic interests in the region of the 
Middle East.  
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 The first issue critical to their mutual relations was the Georgian war 
and the position of the Alliance towards it. The war caused a gap in their 
relationship, which was on the lowest level in a decade and was slowly 
improving in the next two years. Their relations were officially re-established 
in 2010, when Russia was invited by NATO to the Lisbon Summit. This 
point of their mutual relations was caused by the official NATO’s position 
towards the war, stating that “Alliance expressed particular concern over 
Russia’s disproportionate military action which was incompatible with 
Russia’s peacekeeping role in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia” (NATO 2012).  
 Another issue of disagreement was NATO’s “door open” policy and 
its commitment to future enlargement of the Alliance, especially the 
membership of Georgia and Ukraine. The Russian position was supported by 
a strong group of member states within the Alliance, such as Germany and 
France who see Georgia’s accession as unacceptable. Contrary, NATO 
confirmed many times that Georgia is a real candidate for accession.11   
 One of the reasons was the active contribution of this country to the 
ISAF as the second largest troop contributor from all non-NATO countries 
(NATO 2012).  Although, the Dialogue on Ukraine’s membership started in 
2005, its accession was not realistic in the near future. The key reason for this 
situation, at that time, was that Ukraine was not following the NATO 
membership as a goal in the foreign policy. The second reason was low 
public support of the Ukrainians to the membership. According to Gallup 
(2010), almost 40% of the Ukrainians see NATO as a threat, than as a 
protection (17%). Eventually, the change may occur in future, but both 
memberships are only theoretical opportunities at the moment.   
 NATO’s policy toward Ukrainian and Georgian membership is clear. 
They are allowed to develop closer connections to NATO according to their 
aspiration and progress, until they are ready for membership. However, each 
of them has major obstacles to the membership. Ukraine struggles with 
internal political challenges and Ukrainians remain skeptical that joining the 
Alliance is a worthy ambition. In the meantime, the Russia-Georgia war in 
2008 guaranteed that their territorial dispute will not be solved anytime soon. 
At NATO’s Summit in 2009, the Alliance’s leaders announced that 
“NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies which share 
the values of [the] Alliance; which are willing and able to assume the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership; and whose inclusion can 
contribute to common security and stability” (NATO 2009). Those are the 
three criteria which refer to the enlargement process. The first two were 
                                                          
11 This NATO position was confirmed on the NATO Summits in Bucharest (2008), in 
Lisbon (2010) and in Chicago (2012). 
European Scientific Journal May 2017 edition Vol.13, No.13 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
162 
standard criteria during the post-Cold War period, and the third one 
represents the additional difficulty for Ukraine and Georgia related to their 
disputes with Russia. In July 2009 during its official visit to Moscow, the US 
president Barack Obama stated that ‘a majority of the population of the 
candidate country must support membership’ (The White House, 2009). This 
was considered as an additional criterion, clearly and undoubtedly directed to 
Ukraine (Goldgeier 2010: 11-13). 
 Traditionally, the question of NATO enlargement evokes a negative 
reaction in Russia. This Russian attitude is based in something more 
profound than the nature of its power. There are both rational and emotional 
causes of this perception. First, Russia is a continental state and for that 
reason has always wanted to secure itself by surrounding with friendly states 
and allies. Nowadays, it is very difficult for Russian political tradition to 
ignore NATO enlargement towards East. The NATO expansion has a 
powerful negative psychological effect to Russian strategic thinking. Second, 
NATO enlargement with former republics of the Soviet Union implies a 
decline of international status among Russian politicians and political elites, 
but also among Russian people. Aside from the emotional causes of this 
opinion, most Russian military strategists and political experts view NATO 
enlargement “as a violation of the strategic balance of forces in Europe” 
(Alexeev, 2014:17). Russia has a few significant questions regarding NATO 
expansion on East, such as: how will NATO expansion ease Russia’s security 
concerns; how will enlargement of NATO with former Soviet republics 
enhance security in the region; and what type of threats accelerate NATO to 
new wave of enlargement and accepting new members?   
 However, this kind of attitude cannot lead to a conclusion that NATO 
is considered as a threat to Russia. Russia and its officials, very frequently 
express their disapproving opinions and negative rhetoric to debate NATO’s 
policies, which may create an image of a constant external threat, but in 
practice, Russia is prepared for cooperation with NATO in the areas of 
terrorism, Afghanistan, and counter-drug trafficking. 
 Although, Russia does not have any disagreements with NATO 
member states that could theoretically lead to conflict of interests in the 
foreseeable future, many Russians view NATO as an old-fashioned alliance 
from 20th century which expands unrealistically in order to make Europe 
stronger in the international security ambiance, although its rhetoric about the 
necessity of basic modifications in the character of security threats in the 
region of Eurasia, which require new means.      
 The third disagreement was about missile defense in Europe that was 
considered as a catalyst for their mutual relations. There were two possible 
scenarios: it could either lead to cooperation in a pragmatic manner or to 
worsening of their relations. According to Dmitri Trenin, the “missile 
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defense can be either a game changer or a game breaker”. As a game changer 
it can lead to real cooperation in foreseeable future, but as a game breaker it 
can be a linkage toward the past with a possible danger of going one step 
backward (Trenin 2010). The last couple of years there were efforts on the 
both sides to make a progress on this issue, in particular through the activity 
of NRC in this area (Chicago Summit Declaration 2012).    
 Russia’s plan on the missile defense in Europe was to participate as 
an equal partner on the basis of transparency and reciprocity and to have an 
equal participation in decision-making process. Therefore, Russia requires 
“more transparency” from the Alliance about missile defense plans and 
abilities in order to guarantee them that it poses no threat.  
 Russia made a proposal to NATO to create the so-called ‘sectoral’ 
missile defense. Each country will have a responsibility to ensure the missile 
defense protection for its own region in Europe. These conditions were 
inappropriate for NATO (Padrtovẚ, 2012: 28-30). If these two separate 
systems that work independently of each other were developed by NATO, 
Russia would have tried to lock them, in order to secure its own right of veto. 
This opposes the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which 
excludes any right of veto over the operations of the other or any kind of 
limitation on the rights of Russia or NATO to autonomous decision-making 
and action (Sherr 2011).  
 This type of collaboration requires trust that does not exist. The future 
progress of their collaboration in practice will help to enhance mutual 
confidence and improve their relations. On the other hand, if Russia ignores 
the opportunity to cooperate with the Alliance on common missile defense in 
Europe, the USA and NATO will surely produce a new system without 
Russia. This is an extraordinary challenge for Russia, because the situation of 
status quo is not suitable option that can be maintained easily (Trenin 2012). 
 A major issue for Europe is whether Russia will remain to the 
provisions of the OSCE Final Act from Helsinki, particularly, the prohibition 
on changing borders by force. In August 2008 Russia broke that treaty when 
it used force in order to support the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
from Georgia. This Russia’s action confirmed the limits of the OSCE’s 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) capacity to provide 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. It confirmed the failure of the NRC to 
take consequential action in the dispute and showed NATO’s limits in 
defending and maintaining the Helsinki Final Act principles on non-NATO 
territory. This was another example where NATO was not capable to manage 
threats on its own.  
 The NRC demonstrated readiness to increase the number of mutual 
practical exercises and training operations to confront problems such as 
nuclear safety and terrorism. The Europeans and their commitments are vital: 
European Scientific Journal May 2017 edition Vol.13, No.13 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
164 
if they can manage to accomplish their obligations, then NATO could 
recommend a joint NATO-Russia reaction to confront urgent situations 
throughout the region. In this case, NATO should assure Russia that these 
efforts are purely defensive and that transparency is crucial (Goldgeier 2010: 
12). 
 In the last two years, namely, at the beginning of 2015, the nuclear 
strategy of Russia provoked a great concern in NATO structures. Russia’s 
strategy in the field of nuclear weapons indicated a tendency for decreasing 
the intensity of using nuclear forces (Reuters 2015). In response to this kind 
of transformation, NATO member states must also update their nuclear 
arsenal. In that connotation, the Defense Secretary of Great Britain, Sir 
Michael Fallon, assumed that Russia may repeat strategies and methods used 
in Ukraine in Baltic countries that are members of the NATO (The Guardian 
2015). Similarly, the defense minister of Norway, Ine E. Soreide, noted that 
the intentions of Russia were uncertain (The New York Time 2015). 
Tensions between NATO and Russia increased in November 2015 when 
Russian warplane crushed in the airspace of Turkey while on a mission in 
Syria. Turkey toppled the warplane because it supposedly violated the 
airspace of Turkey, but Russian officials disagreed with the assumption that 
the warplane entered the Turkish airspace. Another reason for disagreement 
was the formal invitation of Montenegro to join NATO in December 2015, 
which led to expected reaction on the side of Russia that it would suspend 
cooperation with Montenegro. 
 In 2016, NATO-Russia relations were characterized by intense and 
constant disagreements. Launching the European missile defense shield by 
NATO in May 2016 confirmed that NATO and Russia had no constructive 
agenda to follow. Russia repeated its position that launching this system 
would weaken the Russian security and would create ‘direct threat’ to 
regional and global security (The New York Times 2016). 
 In July 2016, Warsaw was a host city of the NATO Summit. The 
Alliance agreed to strengthen Baltic States and eastern Poland against the 
Russia’s threats, by moving military troops in eastern Poland and Baltic 
states by early 2017 and enhancing the sea and air security in these allies. 
According to the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, the purpose of this decision 
was to demonstrate, once again, “the solidarity, determination and ability to 
act” by activating an “immediate allied response to any aggression” and 
suspending all kinds of cooperation with Russia – military and civilian, while 
demonstrating openness to political dialogue (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 
2016). Heads of State and Government at the Summit declared that Russia 
with its assistance for the regime and its military presence in Syria increased 
the security challenges for NATO allies. For that reason, NATO leaders 
decided to support Ukraine and to make its security and defense bodies 
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effective and responsible. As predicted, the Summit briefly deteriorated the 
confrontation, because the agenda included issues traditionally criticized by 
Russia, such as progress in missile defense, the enlargement process, and 
finalizing the strategic rearrangement started at the Summit in Wales (Klein 
and Major, 2015).   
 Shortly after the Summit, the NATO-Russia Council held its meeting, 
where Russia expressed concerns over NATO military activities in the region 
of the Black sea. In July 2016, Russia stated that a new weapon system 
(surface-to-air) would be positioned in Crimea, strengthening Russia’s anti-
access abilities around the Crimean peninsula.  
 Some Russian authors, such as Alexey Fenenko, Fyodor Lukyanov, 
Igor Yurgens and Dmirty V. Suslov, analyze the disagreements between 
Russia and NATO in the shadow of Russia-USA relationship.  
 According to Fenenko (2016), the hostility between Russia and the 
USA changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He determines two 
aspects of their mutual relation that irritated Washington. The first one is 
related with the fact that Moscow had preserved the nuclear potential of the 
former Soviet Union. Consequently, Russia was the only country that has the 
military capability to start a war against the USA, due to their similar military 
power. Second, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council 
and may block US’s actions or make them illegitimate. Despite declared 
strategic partnership between them, the USA intentions were to destroy 
Russia’s strategic capabilities to a safe level for the USA. The economic 
recovery of Russia would lead to modernization of its military industry, 
which was not in a best interest of the USA. Fenenko warned about the 
possible Washington’s actions against Russia, such as sanctions against 
individual Russian companies or discovering a new human rights issue. It 
was clear that economic battle against Russia could benefit the USA only 
with full support of the EU. Russia was concerned with the international law 
reform initiated by the USA, which generated two principles: forced removal 
of the leaders of sovereign states with their accusation by an international 
tribunal and forced disarmament of dangerous regimes, as seen by 
Washington, by eliminating their weapons of mass destruction.  
 Lukyanov (2014, pp. 9-24) argues that President Putin will try to use 
the size and power of the USA against it in a form of geopolitical aikido. 
Putin seems unwilling to stimulate instability in countries like Afghanistan, 
because it can have a spillover effect on Russia. As an alternative, Putin will 
try to bond countries troubled by the USA behavior in order to create a 
coalition that can be able to press for a repair of global institutions that would 
weaken Western and American dominance. Lukyanov suggests Beijing as a 
key player in this scenario, together with any other government dissatisfied 
with the overall consequences of globalization in political, economic, social 
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and cultural sphere. Russia could accelerate the process by developing a new 
ideology based on justice and equality among nations. He concludes that it 
may be a better solution for Moscow to end its cooperation with Washington 
in the area of security, rather than its active antagonism to the USA. For 
instance, Lukyanov stated that President Putin saved the USA from another 
war or embarrassing retreat in the Middle East by assisting and agreement on 
Syria’s chemical weapons. In the meantime, U.S. international expectations 
have increased to such a level that they are hard to ignore or fulfill. The USA 
needs Russian help in order to avoid future humiliation in the Middle East. 
 Yurgens (2014, pp. 39-49) evaluates the challenges to Russia’s 
economy entailed in any confrontation, adding that any extended crisis would 
be more influenced by Russian neoconservatives, whom he describes as 
‘foreign policy hawks’ who are very pleased with the economic isolation 
from the West. Russian policy is likely to become less economically rational, 
as Russia’s economic integration with the USA and the EU will weaken the 
importance of Russian politics and decision-making. Therefore, Russia will 
have to look for new markets or to become economically dependent upon 
China if the relations with the West continue to be tense.  
 Suslov (2013, p.7) elaborates three components of the defective and 
negative relationship between Russia and the USA. The first component is 
related with the lack of a new agenda in their mutual relations, which would 
correspond to the circumstances and challenges in the changing international 
environment, including managing nuclear multipolarity, the strategic 
dialogue on the Asia pacific and China, the development of the Far east and 
Siberia, and Afghanistan and the region of Central Asia. The second 
component includes the strategic deterrence and counterbalancing philosophy 
which interfere with the military and defense sector. The last component 
represents the backward nature of the relationship between Russia and USA 
in the areas of international and regional security and foreign policy, 
especially the role of arms control. According to Suslov (2013, pp. 14-18) 
there are two possible scenarios for the future relationship between these two 
countries: a selective and pragmatic cooperation or comprehensive 
deterioration and a new crisis.  
 
Ukraine crisis and annexation of the Crimean peninsula - influence and 
consequences 
 The additional complex issue which can be included in the previously 
explained set of issues of disagreement is the Russian invasion and 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 which lead to deepening 
the actual crisis between both entities. In the beginning of September 2014 
was held NATO Summit in Newport, South Wales. It was expected that the 
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Summit will review the ISAF mission that ended in late 2014. Instead, the 
Summit offered a response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. (Foxall 2014: 3). 
 The response of the Alliance was as expected: reaffirmation of its 
commitments to defend the allies from Central and Eastern Europe, 
strengthening the cooperation with Ukraine, and threatening Russia by 
suspending all practical collaboration. It was a second time NATO had done 
so since Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. However, extended sphere of 
influence of Russia was not the only important concern facing NATO. There 
were other concerns too, such as, the rise of Islamic State in the Middle East 
and the partial success of NATO’s operation in Libya and Afghanistan. 
Nevertheless, the Ukraine crisis remained the main factor amongst all, 
because it tested the preparedness of the Alliance to answer such a disturbing 
question.   
 In late 2013 began the Ukraine crisis with demonstrations on Kyiv’s 
Maidan. The invasion of Ukraine induced fear that its hostility could 
endangered the territorial integrity of NATO’s eastern members while 
creating issues about NATO’s capability to deter Russian aggression in its 
neighborhood and beyond. Russia made obstructions to US policy in Syria by 
arming the Assad regime and providing diplomatic cover for its assaults on 
US backed rebels. The relationship between Russia and the USA turned into 
a crisis that can undermine future opportunities for cooperation and threaten 
to destabilize the transatlantic community. In 2009, when US President 
Barack Obama first entered office, he initiated the “reset” policy towards 
Russia which enabled these two countries to cooperate on a broad variety of 
issues, from development and trade to arms reduction and counterterrorism. 
During the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev, Russia redirected its focus from 
power competition to pragmatic cooperation with the USA. The accession of 
Russia to the WTO in 2012 and the assistance of Russia in implementing 
sanctions against Iran were signals that their mutual relations, although very 
challenging, offered meaningful opportunities for pragmatic cooperation 
(Smith and Twardowski, 2017).  
 In late February 2014 when pro-Russian forces took control over 
Crimea, it developed into an international crisis. The first explanation from 
Russia was that the forces were local units for self-defense, but later 
acknowledged that they were Russian military units without official marks 
for their military rank.  NATO criticized military intensification in the 
peninsula, expressing “grave concern” about the Russian Parliament’s 
decision from 1 March, which gave President Vladimir Putin permission to 
use Russia’s military forces on the Ukrainian territory. The Sevastopol 
authorities, on 11 March proclaimed peninsula’s independence from Ukraine 
and 10 days later the Crimea was incorporated into Russia. The U.S. answer 
to annexation of Crimea was expelling Russia from the G8, imposing 
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economic and political sanctions and military measures in order to reassure 
the eastern allies. The Obama administration promised to increase the US 
military presence (training, exercise and rotational presence) in eastern 
European countries (Smith and Twardowski, 2017).  
 In March 2014, the Information and Press Department of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented with disagreement to the statement 
of the NATO Council, in which Russia was accused of military escalation in 
Crimea and violation of the principles of international law. In the statement, 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the existing threats to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are caused exclusively by 
the internal political crisis12.  
 NATO’s response to Russian aggression has been primarily 
rhetorical. The Alliance urged Russia to adhere to its duties, responsibilities 
and obligations in accordance to international law, to comply with 
international law, and to participate in a dialogue with Kyiv in order to find 
political and diplomatic solution for solving the crisis. However, the Alliance 
took some actions, too. In April, NATO postponed the military and civilian 
cooperation with Russia and a few months later, in July, the European Union 
ended all future arms sales to Russia. NATO has strengthened its 
commitment to defend countries from Central and Eastern Europe by 
initiating a number of activities, such as air defense and surveillance, 
maritime deployments and military exercises. Despite these initiatives, the 
Alliance had to demonstrate its readiness and capacity to defend its interests 
and its allies in Eastern Europe. The Ukraine’s crisis sharpened the concerns 
about Russia’s strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the region of Eastern 
Europe (Foxall 2014: 6-7). Some Russian, European and US analysts argued 
that the ignorance of the West for the Russian security needs forced Russia to 
respond militarily, blaming NATO and EU for depriving Russia of its 
security space in Eastern Europe, especially regarding the expansion of 
NATO on East and the “close relationship” between Ukraine and EU 
association agreement (Smith and Twardowski, 2017).  
 The crisis in Ukraine was a ‘game changer’ for the Alliance, because 
until that moment the security priorities of NATO had been focused on 
terrorism and unsuccessful states. The Ukraine crisis demonstrated the need 
for re-assessment of the threats and military capabilities and development of 
a strategy for addressing unconventional forms of warfare. For the first time 
                                                          
12 Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding the question put by the mass media about the statement 
of the NATO Council on the situation in Ukraine. 3 March 2014. 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/72562   
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since the end of the Cold War, NATO had an obligation to focus on the 
defense of Eastern Europe against Russia. 
 The context of mutual relations between Russia and NATO has 
changed - Russia has gone from being a ‘strategic partner’ to a hostile 
aggressor. NATO has been trying to develop new strategies in order to 
respond to Russia’s use of unconventional warfare. Russia assumed that the 
absence of political will on the side of NATO was the reason why NATO did 
not respond to aggression.  
 Their relationship was recovered after the Russo-Georgian War in 
2008. It was a reflection of a consensus within NATO that a strong, durable, 
cooperative and trusting relationship with Russia is necessary for 
transatlantic security. There are still a number of issues and areas of shared 
interests, including: non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, 
anti-terrorism, arms control, and security in the Arctic. However, after the 
Ukraine crisis it was obvious that NATO need to provide protection against 
future Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.  
 
Conclusion 
 More recently, both NATO and Russia appear to be determined in 
taking advantages of the practical effects of their relation. More than two 
decades since the end of the Cold War, the attitudes of NATO and Russia 
from that period have continued to affect their political views. Competition, 
distrust and political disagreements along with the different approaches about 
the future of European security are easily noticeable in relations between 
NATO and Russia. 
 Moreover, the perception of NATO in Russia is more simplified: the 
USA equates to NATO. The feeling of distrust and suspicions about other’s 
motives are still present and despite the improvements in their relations, the 
level of cooperation is still somewhere in the middle between antagonism in 
the past and the desired future cooperation. The ISAF confirmed that Russia 
can play a significant role in NATO’s missions and that both sides are 
capable to work together in issues and areas of common interests. Their 
cooperation is expected in common security challenges in order to ensure the 
security in the Euro-Atlantic zone.  
 There is a certain possibility for continuous cooperation in the areas 
of shared interests including crisis management, nuclear weapons issues, 
non-proliferation of weapons for mass destruction, search and rescue at sea, 
arms control, defense industrial cooperation, defense strategy, defense 
reform, Cooperative Air-space Initiative, civil emergencies, and increasing 
public knowledge of the NRC, especially in the areas of fight against 
terrorism, counter-piracy and counter-narcotics, which are the most 
developed areas of cooperation between both entities.  
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 As was mentioned previously in this paper, the cooperation between 
NATO and Russia on the issue of missile defense in Europe has the ability to 
either move their mutual relations to a higher level or to end up in an 
impasse. This issue has little technical obstacles, it is mostly the 
misconception and political and strategic concerns of Russia that can block 
the cooperation on missile defense.  The second scenario will not mean 
another Cold War, but will produce deeper enmity and isolation of Russia. 
 Over recent years a number of events, including the deficiency of 
conventional threats, the confusing post-Cold War role, and decrease of the 
defense expenses amongst its members contributed to a sense that NATO 
may be an inappropriate and irrelevant organization. Despite its intervention 
in Libya and counter-terrorism operations after terrorist attacks in the USA 
on 11 September 2001, NATO has faced an identity crisis. However, 
invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimean peninsula, and destabilization of 
Ukraine gave NATO a new aspiration. Russia was a NATO partner for many 
years and a key country for global and transatlantic security. For that reason, 
Russia was a powerful reminder that one of the crucial priorities of NATO is 
the security of its member states. These events were lessons for NATO. The 
annexation of Crimea demonstrated the ineffectiveness of NATO’s 
conventional deterrence and effectiveness of Russian unconventional warfare 
tactics. 
 In 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his speech in Chatham House on 
occasion of the Wales Summit of NATO (in September 2014), emphasized 
that “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was an attempt to rewrite 
international rules and recreate a sphere of influence.” He underlined three 
key issues as a response to overall threats: finalizing the mission in 
Afghanistan; strengthening the concept of collective defense; and continuous 
global engagement. The second key question for the Wales Summit was how 
to strengthen NATO’s collective defense. Rasmussen focuses on the 
necessity of multi-dimensional alliance instead of one-dimensional: the 
Alliance has to demonstrate readiness to respond and act rapidly in today’s 
unpredictable security environment. For that reason, NATO developed the 
Alliance Readiness Action Plan, which includes the best techniques to deploy 
NATO’s forces for deterrence and defense. The third big issue was about 
global engagement of the Alliance. In order to provide effective, coherent 
and timely support, NATO developed a new Defense Capacity Building 
Initiative, which will focus on the support in the areas of military training, 
defense reform and defense planning. 
 NATO should confirm its policy of accessibility to European 
countries that meet its criteria in order to retain the cohesion of Article X and 
to avoid creating unwanted divisions in Europe. The low speed pathway to 
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membership for Ukraine and Georgia minimizes the uneasiness of Russia and 
generate better options for cooperation with Russia.  
 During the past two decades, NATO and Russia learned to cooperate 
on a variety of issues. They have solved complex situations and conflicts and 
rise above their essential differences. This positive experience can be used to 
intensify and strengthen cooperation and to explore new compromises on 
future disputes. Despite all motives for optimism, the most challenging issues 
in their relationship require specific caution. 
 As a conclusion, although there is some progress in their relationship, 
we cannot assume that cooperation in the areas of common interests will 
have an increasing effect toward cooperation in other fields or that this 
cooperation can exclude their conflicting approaches on a number of issues 
in the future. Hence, good intentions and good will are the most important 
factors for positive bilateral relations. This is a contention that history has 
confirmed to be mostly correct. 
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